In the
crushing wave that flattened much of
the Democratic Party last month, two
left-leaning states survived not
only intact but in some ways bluer
than before. New York and
California, long-time rivals for
supremacy, may both have seen better
days; but for Democrats, at least,
the prospects there seem better than
ever.
That
these two states became such
outliers from the rest of the United
States reflects both changing
economics and demographics. Over the
past decade, New York and California
underperformed in terms of job
creation across a broad array of
industries. Although still great
repositories of wealth, their
dominant metropolitan areas
increasingly bifurcated between the
affluent and poor. The middle class
continues to ebb away for more
opportune climes.
Each
state has also developed a large and
politically effective public sector.
In both states, no candidate opposed
to its demands won statewide office
in 2010. At the same time, the
traditional, broad-based business
interest has become increasingly
ineffective; instead, some powerful
groups such as big developers, Wall
Street, Silicon Valley, and
Hollywood, became part of the
“progressive” coalition, willing and
able to cut their own deals with the
ruling Democratic elite.
In New
York, Republicans did capture a
handful of seats in rural areas that
have historically been friendly to
the GOP, but in California the
Republicans made no headway at all,
even in rural areas. The difference
here can be explained by
demographics. In New York, the rural
population is overwhelmingly Anglo;
in California, much of it is
Hispanic, a group that is both
growing and, for the most part,
tilting increasingly to the left.
Can
the New York and California models
be replicated in other states and
yield political gold for Democrats?
The answer depends on how these two
economies perform over the coming
decades.
Another state model competes for
supremacy. It can be found in Texas,
the Southeast, and parts of the
intermountain West. The hallmarks
are fiscal restraint and an emphasis
on private-sector growth. If these
free market-oriented states can
produce better results than the
coastal megastates, with their
emphasis on government they could
own the political future.
Demographics: The Democrats’ Best
Hope
Right
now, demography is the best friend
Democrats have. Over the next four
decades, the two groups that will
increasingly dominate the political
landscape are Hispanics and
Millennials (the generation born
between 1983 and the millennium).
Both groups tilted leftwards in
recent elections. This trend should
concern even the most jaded
conservatives.
The
Latinization of America, even if
immigration slows, is now
inevitable. Only 12 percent of the
U.S. population in 2000, Hispanics
will become almost 25 percent by
2050. As more Latinos integrate into
society and become citizens, they
are gradually forming a political
force. Since 1990, the number of
registered Latino voters swelled
from 4.4 million to nearly 10
million today.
Anglos—60 percent of whom supported
Republican congressional candidates
in 2010—are beginning to experience
an inexorable decline. In 1960,
whites accounted for more than 90
percent of the electorate; today,
that number is down to 75 percent.
It will drop even more rapidly in
the coming decades, with white
non-Hispanics expected to account
for barely half the nation’s
population by 2050.
California and New York are
laboratories of the new ethnic
politics. In New York, Latinos
represent roughly 12 percent of the
voters, while the overall “minority”
vote has risen to well over 30
percent. California has, by far, the
nation’s largest Hispanic population
and Latinos are now roughly 24
percent of eligible voters. Overall,
non-whites constitute well over a
third of the electorate.
The
growth of the Latino vote works to
Democrats’ advantage. Until the
GOP-sponsored passage in 1994 of the
anti-illegal alien Proposition 187,
Latinos in California routinely
voted upwards of 40 percent
Republican (and even did so for
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in
2006). This year, barely one-third
of California Latinos supported
Republican candidates Meg Whitman
and Carly Fiorina.
The
Republican embrace of what is
perceived by Hispanics as nativism
has clearly alienated Latinos. This
applies not only to California but
also in Arizona, where Latino voters
are now 18 percent of the total; in
Nevada, they represent 14 percent
and played a critical role in
re-electing Majority Leader Harry
Reid.
This
shift is all the more remarkable
given the fact that many Democratic
policies, on both social issues and
regulations squashing economic
opportunity, are at odds with Latino
social conservatism and aspirational
instincts.
Of
course, Latino voters are not the
same in every corner of the country,
and Republicans can do well with
Hispanic voters if conditions are
right. For example, Latinos in
Florida and New Mexico support
Republican candidates far more than
in California or New York. Texas
Republicans picked up two
predominately Latino house districts
along the Mexican border this year.
And several recently elected
high-profile Latinos—Florida Senator
Marco Rubio and Governors Brian
Sandoval in Nevada and Susan
Martinez in New Mexico—earned strong
Hispanic support (Rubio won more
than 45 percent of Latino voters in
a three-way race). Latino Republican
candidates also won in Washington
State and, of all places, Wyoming.
The
elevation of such emerging leaders
could eventually turn the Latinos
into a successfully contested group.
But there is also a distinct
possibility that emboldened
nativist-oriented Republicans
(backed largely by their older,
Anglo base) could embrace policies,
such as abolishing birthright
citizenship, that seem almost
calculated to alienate Latino and
other immigrant voters.
Millennials: Growing Up, Staying
Left?
Latinos and minorities are not even
the GOP’s biggest demographic
challenge. Millennials, the so
called “echo boomers,” constitute a
growing percentage of the
electorate. They also tilted heavily
Democrat. In 2008, Millennials
accounted for 17 percent of the
nation’s voting-age population; by
2012, that share will grow to 24
percent. By 2020, they will account
for more than one-third of the total
population eligible to vote. Their
power will wax while the seniors’,
who broke decisively for the GOP
this year, will inevitably fade.
Millennials and generation X, their
older brothers and sisters,
constitute the majority of
self-professed Democrats, note Mike
Hais and Morley Winograd, authors of
the forthcoming
Millennial Momentum: How a New
Generation Is Remaking America. Last November,
they supported Democratic candidates
55 percent to 42 percent, although
their turnout flagged compared to
what it was in 2008. They can be
expected to turn out in bigger
numbers in the 2012 presidential
election.
A
connection exists between the
Latinization trend and millennial
voters. Boomers were 80 percent
white; among Millennials, at least
the younger cohorts, the majority
are from minority households.
More
critically, on a host of issues—from
the environment to gay rights and
economic re-distribution—this
generation appears well to the left
of older ones. One hopeful note for
libertarian-minded Republicans:
almost half believe that government
is too involved in Americans’ lives
(in this sense, their views are
similar to those of older
generations).
Can
Millennials and generation X-ers be
turned toward the center? History
suggests this is at least possible.
Boomers started off relatively left
of the mainstream, notes political
scientist Larry Sabato (although as
Hais and Winograd suggest, Boomers
were never as “left” as their
louder, and often better-educated,
generation “spokespeople”). In 1972,
their first appearance at the ballot
box, they split between Richard
Nixon and George McGovern while
older voters went overwhelmingly
with President Nixon. In 1976, they
helped put Jimmy Carter in office.
But,
over time, Boomers clearly shifted
to the center-right, and eventually
tracked close to the national
averages. They supported Ronald
Reagan in 1984, Democratic
Leadership Council standard-bearer
Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush.
Politically, Sabato notes, “the
boomers have become their parents.”
Will
today’s younger voters follow a
similar arc? The key lies with how
Republicans deal with critical
issues, such as gay rights and the
environment. It should be sobering
for Republicans that a popular
conservative like Senator Jim
DeMint—the putative godfather of the
Tea Party—lost overwhelmingly among
South Carolina Millennials by 54 to
46 percent against a marginal
Democratic candidate.
“This
doesn't say that the Millennials
will necessarily be Democrats
forever and could never vote for
Republicans,” notes Hais, who
surveyed generational dynamics for
Frank N. Magid Associates, an Iowa-
and Los Angeles-based market
research firm. “Obviously, the
Democrats will have to produce,
especially in the economy. But, I
think that for Millennials to begin
to vote for Republicans, it is the
Republicans and not Millennials who
will have to do most of the
changing. The Republicans will have
to come up with a way to appeal to
an ethnically diverse, tolerant,
civic generation—something they
haven't done very well to date.”
Geography: The Great Republican
Advantage
Demographics may seem a long-term
boon for Democrats, but geographic
trends tilt in the opposite
direction. Actually, Republicans did
exceptionally well in the country’s
fastest-growing places, both within
metropolitan areas and by state.
Democrats won the urban core,
winning it by almost two-to-one in
an otherwise disastrous year for
them. But this is not where
population growth is concentrated.
Out of the 48 metropolitan areas,
notes demographer Wendell Cox,
suburban counties gained more
migrants than core counties in 42
cases over the past decade. Overall
suburbs and exurbs accounted for
roughly 80 percent or more of all
metropolitan growth.
Suburbs and exurbs, where a clear
majority of the country lives, are
where American elections are
determined. Dominated by the
automobile single family houses,
these areas shifted heavily to the
Republicans this year, voting 54 to
43 percent for the GOP. Unless there
is a startling economic development
or the unlikely imposition of
density-promoting national planning
policy, the periphery is likely to
remain the ultimate “decider” in
American politics for the
foreseeable future. The next
generation of homebuyers, the
Millennials, note Hais and Winograd,
also identify suburbs as their
“ideal” place to live—even more than
their boomer parents.
Immigrants also are demonstrating a
strong preference for the suburbs.
Since 1980, the percentage of
immigrants who live in the suburbs
has grown from roughly 40 percent to
above 52 percent. They also remained
the preferred home for most boomers
as they age.
Republicans also dominate the
fastest-growing states: Virginia,
Utah, Florida, North Carolina, and,
most importantly, Texas. Over the
past decade, more than 800,000 more
people moved to Texas than left the
Lone Star State. In contrast, New
York suffered a net migration loss
of over 1.6 million, while
California, once the nation’s
leading destination, lost almost as
many. Texas, Florida, and Virginia
will gain congressional seats while
New York will lose seats and
California, for the first time in
its history, will add none.
More
important still are the reasons
driving this migration: job growth,
cost structure, taxes, and
regulation. While the highest
earners in Hollywood, Silicon
Valley, or Wall Street may still
flourish in the two big blue states,
jobs are evaporating for many
middle- and working-class residents.
For
the vast majority of middle- and
working-class people, the growth
states are increasingly attractive
places for relocation. Over the past
decade, states like Texas, Virginia,
North Carolina, and Utah, according
to a Praxis Strategy Group analysis,
enjoyed faster growth in
middle-income jobs than in the deep
blue strongholds. Texas, for
instance, has increased
middle-income jobs at seven times
the rate of California over the past
decade.
This
job growth extends beyond low-wage
jobs at places like Walmart. Over
the past decade, Texas has increased
its number of so-called STEM jobs
(science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics related jobs) by 14
percent, well over twice the
national average. Virginia and Utah
performed even better. In contrast,
New York and Massachusetts grew
high-tech jobs by a paltry 2.4
percent, while California lagged
with a tiny 1.7 percent increase.
Jockeying for the Future
In its
first two years, the Obama
administration tried to reverse
these geographic trends by steering
funds into universities, mainly
those located in big cities and
along the Northeast and California
coasts. This tilt was natural for an
administration which one Democratic
mayor from central California
described as “Moveon.org run by the
Chicago machine.”
The
Obama administration’s “green”
policies are also designed to favor
major dense urban areas, with large
increases in transit funding,
high-speed rail projects, and grants
for pro-density “smart growth”
policies. But with the resounding
defeat in November, the drive to
force the population into dense and
normally democratically inclined
cities seems certain to ebb. The
demise of the fiscal stimulus will
put increased pressure on states
like New York and California to cut
down their public-sector growth,
further threatening their weak
recoveries.
In the
coming years, budget-constrained
states will have to focus on
private-sector jobs and growth.
Given the likely tight job market
over the next decade, particularly
for minorities and Millennials,
Republicans could do well to
demonstrate the superiority of their
pro-enterprise model.
Currently, red-leaning states top
the list of states with the “best”
business climates. Texas, North
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia
topped a recent survey by Chief
Executive Officer magazine. In
contrast, the bottom rungs are
dominated by New York and
California, as well as by
longstanding Democratic bastions
Michigan, New Jersey, and
Massachusetts.
To
succeed, Democrats will need to
prove capable of something other
than a reverse Midas touch. They
will need to develop a pro-growth,
job-oriented program, something that
they have not done well since the
Clinton era. The decline in the
numbers of pragmatic,
business-oriented Democrats at the
state and federal levels could make
that job tougher than ever.
It is
still possible that, as Millennials
and Latinos flock to the suburbs,
blue state demographics could
overwhelm red state geography. In a
decade, for example, Texas will
likely be more far Latino than
Asian; by 2040, according to
demographer Steven Murdoch, the
overall minority population, could
be
three times that of Anglos.
At the same time, surging high-end
employment will bring more educated,
socially liberal people to the
state. If these groups continue to
favor the Democrats, Texas and other
deeply red states could turn purple
if not blue.
In the
long run, each party has strong
cards to play. Demographic shifts
favor Democrats, while geography
tilts to the Republicans.
Ultimately, the winner will be the
party that offers a successful
strategy for economic growth—but
without culturally alienating the
demographic groups destined to hold
the balance in the political future.
Joel Kotkin is a Distinguished
Presidential Fellow in Urban Futures
at Chapman University and an adjunct
fellow with the Legatum Institute in
London. He is author of
The Next Hundred Million: America in
2050.
